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Abstract
Randomized protocols for hiding private information can be regarded
as noisy channels in the information-theoretic sense, and the inference of
the concealed information can be regarded as a hypothesis-testing prob-
lem. We consider the Bayesian approach to the problem, and investigate
the probability of error associated to the MAP (Maximum Aposteriori
Probability) inference rule. Our main result is a constructive character-
ization of a convex base of the probability of error, which allows us to
compute its maximum value (over all possible input distributions), and to
identify upper bounds for it in terms of simple functions. As a side result,
we are able to improve the Hellman-Raviv and the Santhi-Vardy bounds
expressed in terms of conditional entropy. We then discuss an application
of our methodology to the Crowds protocol, and in particular we show
how to compute the bounds on the probability that an adversary break
anonymity.
1 Introduction
Information-hiding protocols try to hide the relation between certain facts, that
we wish to maintain hidden, and the observable consequences of these facts. Ex-
ample of such protocols are anonymity protocols like Crowds [23], Onion Rout-
ing [29], and Freenet [8]. Often these protocols use randomization to obfuscate
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the link between the information that we wish to keep hidden and the observed
events. Crowds, for instance, tries to conceal the identity of the originator of a
message by forwarding the message randomly until it reaches its destination, so
that if an attacker intercepts the message, it cannot be sure whether the sender
is the originator or just a forwarder.
In most cases, protocols like the ones above can be regarded as information-
theoretic channels, where the inputs are the facts to keep hidden and the outputs
are the observables. In information theory channels are typically noisy, which
means that for a given input we may obtain several different outputs, each with
a certain probability. A channel is then characterized by what is called transfer
matrix, whose elements are the conditional probabilities of obtaining a certain
output given a certain input. In our case, the matrix represents the correlation
between the facts and the observables. An adversary can try to infer the facts
from the observables using the Bayesian method for hypothesis testing, which is
based on the principle of assuming an a priori probability distribution on the
hidden facts (hypotheses), and deriving from that (and from the matrix) the a
posteriori distribution after a certain event has been observed. It is well known
that the best strategy is to apply the MAP (Maximum Aposteriori Probability)
criterion, which, as the name says, dictates that one should choose the hypoth-
esis with the maximum a posteriori probability given the observation. “Best”
means that this strategy induces the smallest probability of guessing the wrong
hypothesis. The probability of error, in this case, is also called Bayes risk.
Intuitively, the Bayes risk is maximum when the rows of the channel’s matrix
are all the same; this case corresponds indeed to capacity 0, which means that
the input and the output are independent, i.e. we do not learn anything about
the inputs by observing the outputs. This is the ideal situation, from the point
of view of information-hiding protocols. In practice, however, it is difficult to
achieve such degree of privacy. We are then interested in maximizing the Bayes
risk, so to characterize quantitatively the protection offered by the protocol.
The interest in finding good bounds for the probability of error is motivated
also by the fact that in some case the decision region can have a complicated
geometry, or the decision function can be very sensitive to small variations in
the input distribution, thus making it difficult to compute the probability of
error. Some examples of such situations are illustrated in [26]. Good bounds
based on “easy” functions (i.e. functions easy to compute, and not too sensitive
to computational errors) are therefore very useful in such situations as they can
be used as an approximation of the probability of error. It is particularly nice to
have convex bounds since they bound any estimate based on linear interpolation.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the Bayes risk, in relation
to the channel’s matrix, and to produce tight bounds on it.
There are many bounds known in literature for the Bayes risk. One of these
is the equivocation bound, due to Rényi [24], which states that the probability
of error is bounded by the conditional entropy of the channel’s input given the
output. Later, Hellman and Raviv improved this bound by half [15]. Recently,
Santhi and Vardy have proposed a new bound, that depends exponentially on
the (opposite of the) conditional entropy, and which considerably improves the
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Hellman-Raviv bound in the case of multi-hypothesis testing [26]. The latter is
better, however, in the case of binary hypothesis testing.
The Bayes approach to hypothesis testing is often criticized because it as-
sumes the knowledge of the a priori distribution, or at least of a good approx-
imation of it, which is often an unjustified assumption. However, even if the
adversary does not know the a priori distribution, the method is still valid
asymptotically, under the condition that the matrix’s rows are all pairwise dis-
tinguished. Under such condition indeed, as shown in [3], by repeating the
experiment the contribution of the a priori probability becomes less and less
relevant for the computation of the Bayesian risk, and it “washes out” in the
limit. Furthermore, the Bayesian risk converges to 0. At the other extreme,
when the rows are all equal, the Bayes risk does not converge to 0 and its limit
is bound from below by a constant that depends on the input distribution. In
the present paper we continue this investigation by considering what happens
in the intermediate case when some of the rows (not necessarily all) are equal.
1.1 Contribution
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
1. We consider what we call “the corner points” of a piecewise linear function,
and we propose criteria to compute the maximum of the function, and to
identify concave functions that are upper bounds for the given piecewise
linear function, based on the analysis of its corner points only.
2. We consider the hypothesis testing problem in relation to an information-
theoretic channel. In this context, we show that the probability of error
associated to the MAP rule is piecewise linear, and we give a constructive
characterization of a set of corner points, which turns out to be finite.
Together with the results of the previous paragraph, this leads to algo-
rithms to compute the maximum Bayes risk over all the channel’s input
distributions, and to a method to improve functional upper bounds of the
error probability. The improved functions are tight at at least one point.
3. By using the above results about concave functions and corner points,
we give an alternative proof of the Hellman-Raviv and the Santhi-Vardy
bounds on the Bayes risk in terms of conditional entropy. Our proof is
intuitive and works exactly in the same way for both bounds, which were
proven using different techniques in the corresponding papers.
4. Thanks to our characterization of the maximum Bayes risk, we are able to
improve on the Hellman-Raviv and the Santhi-Vardy bounds. These two
bounds are tight (i.e. coincide with the Bayes risk) on the corner points
only for channels of capacity 0. Our improved bounds are tight at at least
one corner point for every channel.
5. We consider the case of protocol re-execution, and we show that in the
intermediate case in which at least two rows are equal the Bayes risk does
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not converge to 0. Furthermore we give a precise lower bound for the limit
of the Bayes risk.
6. We show how to apply the above results to randomized protocols for in-
formation hiding. In particular, we present an analysis of Crowds using
two different network topologies, and derive the maximum Bayes risk for
an adversary who tries to break anonymity, and improved bounds on this
probability in terms of conditional entropy, for any input distribution.
1.2 Related work
Probabilistic notions of anonymity and information-hiding have been explored
in [5, 14, 1, 2]. We discuss the relation with these works in detail in Section 5.
Several authors have considered the idea of using information theory to an-
alyze anonymity. A recent line of work is due to [27, 12]. The main difference
with our approach is that in these works the anonymity degree is expressed in
terms of input entropy, rather than conditional entropy. More precisely, the
emphasis is on the lack of information of the attacker about the distribution of
the inputs, rather than on the capability of the protocol to prevent the attacker
from determining this information from a statistical analysis of the observables
which are visible to the attacker. Moreover, a uniform input distribution is
assumed, while in this paper we abstract from the input distribution.
In [19, 20] the ability to have covert communication as a result of non-perfect
anonymity is explored. These papers focus on the possibility of constructing
covert channels by the users of the protocol, using the protocol mechanisms,
and on measuring the amount of information that can be transferred through
these channels. In [20] the authors also suggest that the channel’s capacity can
be used as an asymptotic measure of the worst-case information leakage. Note
that in [20] the authors warn that in certain cases the notion of capacity might
be too strong a measure to compare systems with, because the holes in the
anonymity of a system might not behave like text book discrete memoryless
channels.
Another information-theoretical approach is the one of [11]. The authors pro-
pose a probabilistic process calculus to describe protocols for ensuring anonymity,
and use the Kullback-Leibler distance (aka relative entropy) to measure the de-
gree of anonymity these protocols can guarantee. More precisely, the degree of
anonymity is defined as the distance between the distributions on the observ-
able traces produced by the original runs of the protocol, and those produced
by the runs after permuting the identities of he users. Furthermore, they prove
that the operators in the probabilistic process calculus are non-expansive with
respect to the Kullback-Leibler distance.
A different approach, still using the Kullback-Leibler distance, is taken in
[9]. In this paper, the authors define as information leakage the difference be-
tween the a priori accuracy of the guess of the attacker, and the a posteriori
one, after the attacker has made his observation. The accuracy of the guess is
defined as the Kullback-Leibler distance between the belief (which is a weight
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attributed by the attacker to each input hypothesis) and the true distribution
on the hypotheses.
In the field of information flow and non-interference there is a line of research
which is related to ours. There have been various papers [18, 13, 6, 7, 16] in which
the so-called high information and the low information are seen as the input and
output respectively of a channel. The idea is that “high” information is meant
to be kept secret and the “low” information is visible; the point is to prevent
the high information from being deduced by observing the low information.
From an abstract point of view, the setting is very similar; technically it does
not matter what kind of information one is trying to conceal, what is relevant
for the analysis is only the probabilistic relation between the input and the
output information. We believe that our results are applicable also to the field
of non-interference.
The connection between the adversary’s goal of inferring a secret from the
observables, and the field of hypothesis testing, has been explored in other pa-
pers in literature, see in particular [17, 21, 22, 3]. To our knowledge, however, [3]
is the only work exploring the Bayes risk in connection to the channel associated
to an information-hiding protocol. More precisely, [3] considers a framework in
which anonymity protocols are interpreted as particular kinds of channels, and
the degree of anonymity provided by the protocol as the converse of the chan-
nel’s capacity (an idea already suggested in [20]). Then, [3] considers a scenario
in which the adversary can enforce the re-execution of the protocol with the
same input, and studies the Bayes risk on the statistics of the repeated experi-
ment. The question is how the adversary can approximate the MAP rule when
the a priori distribution is not known, and the main results of [3] on this topic
is that the approximation is possible when the rows of the matrix are pairwise
different, and impossible when they are all equal (case of capacity 0). Further-
more, in the first case the Bayes risk converges to 0, while in the second case it
does not. In the present paper the main focus is on the Bayes risk as a function
of the a priori distribution, and on the computation of its bounds. However we
also continue the investigation of [3] on the protocol re-execution, and we give
a lower bound to the limit of the Bayes risk in the intermediate case in which
some of the rows (not necessarily all) coincide.
Part of the results of this paper were presented (without proofs) in [4].
1.3 Plan of the paper
Next section recalls some basic notions about information theory, hypothesis
testing and the probability of error. Section 3 proposes some methods to identify
bounds for a function that is generated by a set of corner points; these bounds
are tight on at least one corner point. Section 4 presents the main result of our
work, namely a constructive characterization of the corner points of Bayes risk.
In Section 5 we discuss the relation with some probabilistic information-hiding
notions in literature. Section 6 illustrates an application of our results to the
anonymity protocol Crowds. In Section 7 we study the convergence of the Bayes
risk in the case of protocol re-execution. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Information theory, hypothesis testing and the
probability of error
In this section we briefly review some basic notions in information theory and
hypothesis testing that will be used throughout the paper. We refer to [10] for
more details.
A channel is a tuple (A,O, p(·|·)) where A,O are the sets of input and output
values respectively and p(o|a) is the conditional probability of observing output
o ∈ O when a ∈ A is the input. In this paper, we assume that both A and O are
finite with cardinality n and m respectively. We will also sometimes use indices
to represent their elements: A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} and O = {o1, o2, . . . , om}. The
p(o|a)’s constitute the transfer matrix (which we will simply call matrix ) of the
channel. The usual convention is to arrange the a’s by rows and the o’s by
columns.
In general, we consider the input of a channel as hidden information, and the
output as observable information. The set of input values can also be regarded
as a set of mutually exclusive (hidden) facts or hypotheses. A probability dis-
tribution p(·) over A is called a priori probability, and it induces a probability
distribution over O called the marginal probability of O. In fact,
p(o) =
∑
a
p(a, o) =
∑
a
p(o|a) p(a)
where p(a, o) represents the joint probability of a and o, and we use its definition
p(a, o) = p(o|a)p(a).
When we observe an output o, the probability that the corresponding input
has been a certain a is given by the conditional probability p(a|o), also called
a posteriori probability of a given o, which in general is different from p(a).
This difference can be interpreted as the fact that observing o gives us evidence
that changes our degree of belief in the hypothesis a. The a priori and the a
posteriori probabilities of a are related by Bayes’ theorem:
p(a|o) =
p(o|a) p(a)
p(o)
In hypothesis testing we try to infer the true hypothesis (i.e. the input fact
that really took place) from the observed output. In general, it is not possible to
determine the right hypothesis with certainty. We are interested in minimizing
the probability of error, i.e. the probability of making the wrong guess. Formally,
the probability of error is defined as follows. Given the decision function f :
O → A adopted by the observer to infer the hypothesis, let Ef : A → 2
O be
the function that gives the error region of f when a ∈ A has occurred, namely:
Ef (a) = {o ∈ O | f(o) 6= a}
Let ηf : A → [0, 1] be the function that associates to each a ∈ A the probability
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that f gives the wrong input when a ∈ A has occurred, namely:
ηf (a) =
∑
o∈Ef (a)
p(o|a)
The probability of error for f is then obtained as the sum of the probability of
error for each possible input, averaged over the probability of the input:
Pf =
∑
a
p(a) ηf (a)
In the Bayesian framework, the best possible decision function fB , namely the
decision function that minimizes the probability of error, is obtained by applying
the MAP (Maximum Aposteriori Probability) criterion, that chooses an input a
with a maximum p(a|o). Formally:
fB(o) = a ⇒ ∀a
′ p(a|o) ≥ p(a′|o)
The probability of error associated with fB , also called the Bayes risk, is then
given by (we will use the notation Pe instead than PfB for simplicity)
Pe = 1 −
∑
o
p(o) max
a
p(a|o) = 1 −
∑
o
max
a
p(o|a) p(a)
Note that fB , and the Bayes risk, depend on the inputs’ a priori probability.
The input distributions can be represented as the elements ~x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
of the domain D(n) defined as
D(n) = {~x ∈ Rn |
∑
i xi = 1 and ∀i xi ≥ 0}
(also called an (n−1)-simplex) where the correspondence is given by xi = p(ai)
for all i’s. In the rest of the paper we will take the MAP rule as decision function
and view the Bayes risk as a function Pe : D
(n) → [0, 1] defined by
Pe(~x) = 1 −
∑
i
max
j
p(oi|aj)xj (1)
We will identify probability distributions and their vector representation freely
throughout the paper.
There are some notable results in literature relating the Bayes risk to the
information-theoretic notion of conditional entropy, also called equivocation. Let
us first recall the concept of random variable and its entropy. A random variable
A is determined by a set of values A and a probability distribution p(·) over A.
The entropy of A, H(A), is given by
H(A) = −
∑
a
p(a) log p(a)
The entropy measures the uncertainty of a random variable. It takes its maxi-
mum value log n when A’s distribution is uniform and its minimum value 0 when
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A is constant. We usually consider the logarithm in base 2 and thus measure
entropy in bits.
Now let A,O be random variables. The conditional entropy H(A|O) is de-
fined as
H(A|O) = −
∑
o
p(o)
∑
a
p(a|o) log p(a|o)
The conditional entropy measures the amount of uncertainty of A when O is
known. It can be shown that 0 ≤ H(A|O) ≤ H(A). It takes its maximum
value H(A) when O reveals no information about A, i.e. when A and O are
independent, and its minimum value 0 when O completely determines the value
of A.
Comparing H(A) and H(A|O) gives us the concept of mutual information
I(A;O), which is defined as
I(A;O) = H(A) − H(A|O)
Mutual information measures the amount of information that one random vari-
able contains about another random variable. In other words, it measures the
amount of uncertainty about A that we lose when observing O. It can be shown
that it is symmetric (I(A;O) = I(O;A)) and that 0 ≤ I(A;O) ≤ H(A). The
maximum mutual information between A and O over all possible input distri-
butions p(·) is known as the channel’s capacity :
C = max
p(·)
I(A;O)
The capacity of a channel gives the maximum rate at which information can be
transmitted using this channel without distortion.
Given a channel, let ~x be the a priori distribution on the inputs. Recall that
~x also determines a probability distribution on the outputs. Let A and O be the
random variables associated to the inputs and outputs respectively. The Bayes
risk is related to H(A|O) by the Hellman-Raviv bound [15]:
Pe(~x) ≤
1
2
H(A|O) (2)
and by the Santhi-Vardy bound [26]:
Pe(~x) ≤ 1 − 2
−H(A|O) (3)
We remark that, while the bound (2) is tighter than (3) in case of binary hypoth-
esis testing, i.e. when n = 2, (3) gives a much better bound when n becomes
larger. In particular the bound in (3) is always limited by 1, which is not the
case for (2).
3 Convexly generated functions and their bounds
In this section we characterize a special class of functions on probability dis-
tributions, and we present various results regarding their bounds which lead to
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methods to compute their maximum, to prove that a concave function is an up-
per bound, and to derive an upper bound from a concave function. The interest
of this study is that the probability of error will turn out to be a function in
this class.
We start by recalling some basic notions of convexity: let R be the set of real
numbers. The elements λ1, λ2, . . . , λk ∈ R constitute a set of convex coefficients
iff ∀i λi ≥ 0 and
∑
i λi = 1. Given a vector space V , a convex combination of
~x1, ~x2, . . . , ~xk ∈ V is any vector of the form
∑
i λi ~xi where the λi’s are convex
coefficients. A subset S of V is convex if and only if every convex combination
of vectors in S is also in S. It is easy to see that for any n the domain D(n)
of probability distributions of dimension n is convex. Given a subset S of V ,
the convex hull of S, which we will denote by ch(S), is the smallest convex set
containing S. Since the intersection of convex sets is convex, it is clear that
ch(S) always exists.
We now introduce (with a slight abuse of terminology) the concept of convex
base: Intuitively, a convex base of a set S is a subset of S whose convex hull
contains S.
Definition 3.1. Given the vector sets S, U , we say that U is a convex base for
S if and only if U ⊆ S and S ⊆ ch(U).
In the following, given a vector ~x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), and a function f from
n-dimensional vectors to reals, we will use the notation (~x, f(~x)) to denote the
(n + 1)-dimensional vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn, f(~x)). Similarly, given a vector set
S in a n-dimensional space, we will use the notation (S, f(S)) to represent the
set of vectors {(~x, f(~x)) | ~x ∈ S} in a (n + 1)-dimensional space. The notation
f(S) represents the image of S under f , i.e. f(S) = {f(~x) | ~x ∈ S}.
We are now ready to introduce the class of functions that we mentioned at
the beginning of this section:
Definition 3.2. Given a vector set S, a convex base U of S, and a function
f : S → R, we say that (U, f(U)) is a set of corner points of f if and only
if (U, f(U)) is a convex base for (S, f(S)). We also say that f is convexly
generated by (U, f(U)).
Of particular interest are the functions that are convexly generated by a
finite number of corner points. This is true for piecewise linear functions in
which S can be decomposed into finitely many convex polytopes (n-dimensional
polygons) and f is equal to a linear function on each of them. Such functions
are convexly generated by the finite set of vertices of these polytopes.
We now give a criterion for computing the maximum of a convexly generated
function.
Proposition 3.3. Let U be a convex base of S and let f : S → R be con-
vexly generated by (U, f(U)). If f(U) has a maximum element b, then b is the
maximum value of f on S.
Proof. Let b be the maximum of f(U). Then for every ~u ∈ U we have that
f(~u) ≤ b. Consider now a vector ~x ∈ S. Since f is convexly generated by
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(U, f(U)), there exist ~u1, ~u2, . . . , ~uk in U such that f(~x) is obtained by convex
combination from f(~u1), f(~u2), . . . , f(~uk) via some convex coefficients λ1, λ2,
. . . , λk. Hence:
f(~x) =
∑
i λif(~ui)
≤
∑
i λib since f(~ui) ≤ b
= b λi’s being convex coefficients
Note that if U is finite then f(U) always has a maximum element.
Next, we propose a method for establishing functional upper bounds for f ,
when they are in the form of concave functions.
We recall that, given a vector set S, a function g : S → R is concave
if and only if for any ~x1, ~x2, . . . , ~xk ∈ S and any set of convex coefficients
λ1, λ2, . . . , λk ∈ R we have
∑
i
λi g(~xi) ≤ g(
∑
i
λi~xi)
Proposition 3.4. Let U be a convex base of S, let f : S → R be convexly
generated by (U, f(U)), and let g : S → R be concave. Assume that for all
~u ∈ U f(~u) ≤ g(~u) holds. Then we have that g is an upper bound for f , i.e.
∀~x ∈ S f(~x) ≤ g(~x)
Proof. Let ~x be an element of S. Since f is convexly generated, there exist ~u1,
~u2, . . . , ~uk in U such that (~x, f(~x)) is obtained by convex combination from
(~u1, f(~u1)), (~u2, f(~u2)), . . . , (~uk, f(~uk)) via some convex coefficients λ1, λ2, . . . ,
λk. Hence:
f(~x) =
∑
i λif(~ui)
≤
∑
i λig(~ui) since f(~ui) ≤ g(~ui)
≤ g(
∑
i λi~ui) by the concavity of g
= g(~x)
We also give a method to obtain functional upper bounds, that are tight on
at least one corner point, from concave functions.
Proposition 3.5. Let U be a convex base of S, let f : S → R be convexly
generated by (U, f(U)), and let g : S → R be concave and non-negative. Let
R = {c | ∃~u ∈ U : f(~u) ≥ c g(~u)}. If R has an upper bound co, then the function
co g is a functional upper bound for f satisfying
∀~x ∈ S f(~x) ≤ co g(~x)
Furthermore, if co ∈ R then f and co g coincide at least at one point.
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Proof. We first show that f(~u) ≤ co g(~u) for all ~u ∈ U . Suppose, by contradic-
tion, that this is not the case. Then there exists ~u ∈ U such that f(~u) > co g(~u).
If g(~u) = 0 then for all c ∈ R : f(~u) > c g(~u) = 0 so the set R is not bounded,
which is a contradiction. Considering the case g(~u) > 0 (g is assumed to be
non-negative), let c = f(~u)
g(~u) . Then c > co and again we have a contradiction
since c ∈ R and co is an upper bound of R . Hence by Proposition 3.4 we have
that co g is an upper bound for f .
Furthermore, if co ∈ R then there exists ~u ∈ U such that f(~u) ≥ co g(~u), so
f(~u) = co g(~u) and the bound is tight as this point.
Corollary 3.6. If U is finite and ∀~u ∈ U : g(~u) = 0 ⇒ f(~u) ≤ 0, then the
maximum element of R always exists and is equal to
max
~u∈U,g(~u)>0
f(~u)
g(~u)
Finally, we develop a proof technique that will allow us to prove that a
certain set is a set of corner points of a function f . Let S be a set of vectors.
The extreme points of S, denoted by extr(S), is the set of points of S that cannot
be expressed as the convex combination of two distinct elements of S. A subset
of Rn is called compact if it is closed and bounded. Our proof technique uses
the Krein-Milman theorem which relates a compact convex set to its extreme
points.
Theorem 3.7 (Krein-Milman). A compact and convex vector set is equal to
the convex hull of its extreme points.
We refer to [25] for the proof. Now since the extreme points of S are enough
to generate S, to show that a given set (U, f(U)) is a set of corner points, it
suffices to show that it includes all its extreme points.
Proposition 3.8. Let S be a compact vector set, U be a convex base of S and
f : S → R be a continuous function. Let T = S \U . If all elements of (T, f(T ))
can be written as the convex combination of two distinct elements of (S, f(S))
then (U, f(U)) is a set of corner points of f .
Proof. Let Sf = (S, f(S)) and Uf = (U, f(U)). Since S is compact and contin-
uous maps preserve compactness then Sf is also compact, and since the convex
hull of a compact set is compact then ch(Sf ) is also compact (note that we
did not require S to be convex). Then ch(Sf ) satisfies the requirements of the
Krein-Milman theorem, and since the extreme points of ch(Sf ) are clearly the
same as those of Sf , we have
ch(extr(ch(Sf ))) = ch(Sf ) ⇒
ch(extr(Sf )) = ch(Sf ) (4)
Now all points in Sf \ Uf can be written as convex combinations of other (dis-
tinct) points, so they are not extreme. Thus all extreme points are contained
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in Uf , that is extr(Sf ) ⊆ Uf , and since ch(·) is monotone with respect to set
inclusion, we have
ch(extr(Sf )) ⊆ ch(Uf )
and by (4),
Sf ⊆ ch(Sf ) ⊆ ch(Uf )
which means that Uf is a set of corner points of f .
The advantage of the above proposition is that it only requires to express
points outside U as convex combinations of any other points, not necessarily
of points in U (as a direct application of the definition of corner points would
require).
3.1 An alternative proof for the Hellman-Raviv and Santhi-
Vardy bounds
Using Proposition 3.4 we can give an alternative, simpler proof for the bounds
in (2) and (3). Let f : D(n) → R be the function f(~y) = 1 − maxj yj . We start
by identifying a set of corner points of f , using Proposition 3.8 to prove that
they are indeed corner points.
Proposition 3.9. The function f defined above is convexly generated by (U, f(U))
with U = U1 ∪ U2 ∪ . . . ∪ Un where, for each k, Uk is the set of all vectors that
have value 1/k in exactly k components, and 0 everywhere else.
Proof. We have to show that for any point ~x in D(n)\U , (~x, f(~x)) can be written
as a convex combination of two points in (D(n), f(D(n))). Let w = maxi xi.
Since ~x /∈ U then there is at least one element of ~x that is neither w nor 0, let
xi be that element. Let k the number of elements equal to w. We create two
vectors ~y, ~z ∈ D(n) as follows
yj =





xi + ǫ if i = j
w − ǫ
k
if xj = w
xj otherwise
zj =





xi − ǫ if i = j
w + ǫ
k
if xj = w
xj otherwise
where ǫ is a small positive number, such that yj , zj ∈ [0, 1] for all j, and such
that w− ǫ
k
, w+ ǫ
k
are “still” the maximum elements of ~y, ~z respectively1. Clearly
~x = 12~y +
1
2~z and since f(~x) = 1 − w, f(~y) = 1 − w +
ǫ
k
and f(~y) = 1 − w − ǫ
k
we have f(~x) = 12f(~y) +
1
2f(~z). Since f is continuous and D
(n) is compact, the
result follows from Proposition 3.8.
1Taking ǫ = min{a, w − b}/2 is sufficient, where a is the minimum positive element of ~x
and b is the maximum element smaller than w.
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Consider now the functions g, h : D(n) → R defined as
g(~y) =
1
2
H(~y) and h(~y) = 1 − 2−H(~y)
where (with a slight abuse of notation) H represents the entropy of the distri-
bution ~y, i.e. H(~y) = −
∑
j yj log yj . From the concavity of H(~y) ([10]) follows
that both g, h are concave.
We now compare g, h withf(~y) = 1 − maxj yj on the corner points on f . A
corner point ~uk ∈ Uk (defined in Proposition 3.9) has k elements equal to 1/k
and the rest equal to 0. So H(~uk) = log k and
f(~uk) = 1 −
1
k
g(~uk) =
1
2
log k
h(~u) = 1 − 2− log k = 1 −
1
k
So f(~u1) = 0 = g(~u1), f(~u2) = 1/2 = g(~u2), and for k > 2, f(~uk) < g(~uk). On
the other hand, f(~uk) = h(~uk), for all k.
Thus, both g and h are greater or equal than f on all its corner points, and
since they are concave, from Proposition 3.4 we have
∀~y ∈ D(n) f(~y) ≤ g(~y) and f(~y) ≤ h(~y) (5)
The rest of the proof proceeds as in [15] and [26]: Let ~x represent an a priori
distribution on A and let the above ~y denote the a posteriori probabilities on
A with respect to a certain observable o, i.e. yj = p(aj |o) = (p(o|aj)/p(o))xj .
Then Pe(~x) =
∑
o p(o)f(~y), so from (5) we obtain
Pe(~x) ≤
∑
o
p(o)
1
2
H(~y) =
1
2
H(A|O) (6)
and
Pe(~x) ≤
∑
o
p(o)(1 − 2−H(~y)) ≤ 1 − 2−H(A|O) (7)
where the last step in (7) is obtained by observing that 1 − 2x is concave and
applying Jensen’s inequality. This concludes the alternative proof of (2) and
(3).
We end this section with two remarks. First, we note that g coincides with
f only on the points of U1 and U2, whereas h coincides with f on all U . This
explains, intuitively, why (3) is a better bound than (2) for dimensions higher
than 2.
Second, we observe that, although h is a good bound for f in the sense that
they coincide in all corner points of f , 1 − 2−H(A|O) is not necessarily a tight
bound for Pe(~x). This is due to the averaging of h, f over the outputs to obtain
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∑
o p(o)(1 − 2
−H(~y)) and Pe(~x) respectively, and also due to the application of
the Jensen’s inequality. In fact, we always loosen the bound unless the channel
has capacity 0 (maximally noisy channel), as we will see in some examples later.
In the general case of non-zero capacity, however, this means that if we want to
obtain a better bound we need to follow a different strategy. In particular, we
need to find directly the corner points of Pe instead than those of the f defined
above. This is what we are going to do in the next section.
4 The corner points of the Bayes risk
In this section we present our main contribution, namely we show that Pe is
convexly generated by (U,Pe(U)) for a finite U , and we give a constructive
characterization of U , so that we can apply the results of the previous section
to compute tight bounds on Pe.
The idea behind the construction of such U is the following: recall that
the Bayes risk is given by Pe(~x) = 1 −
∑
i maxj p(oi|aj)xj . Intuitively, this
function is linear as long as, for each i, the j which gives the maximum p(oi|aj)xj
remains the same while we vary ~x. When, for some i and k, the maximum
becomes p(oi|ak)xk, the function changes its inclination and then it becomes
linear again. The exact point in which the inclination changes is a solution
of the equation p(oi|aj)xj = p(oi|ak)xk. This equation actually represents a
hyperplane (a space in n − 1 dimensions, where n is the cardinality of A) and
the inclination of Pe changes in all its points for which p(oi|aj)xj is maximum,
i.e. it satisfies the inequality p(oi|aj)xj ≥ p(oi|aℓ)xℓ for each ℓ. The intersection
of n − 1 hyperplanes of this kind, and of the one determined by the equation
∑
j xj = 1, is a vertex ~v such that (~v, Pe(~v)) is a corner point of Pe.
Definition 4.1. Given a channel C = (A,O, p(·|·)), the family S(C) of systems
generated by C is the set of all systems of inequalities of the following form:
p(oi1 |aj1)xj1 = p(oi1 |aj2)xj2
p(oi2 |aj3)xj3 = p(oi2 |aj4)xj4
...
p(oir |aj2r−1)xj2r−1 = p(oir |aj2r )xj2r
xj = 0 for j 6∈ {j1, j2, . . . , j2r}
x1 + x2 + . . . + xn = 1
p(oih |aj2h)xj2h ≥ p(oih |aℓ)xℓ for 1 ≤ h ≤ r
and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n
such that all the coefficients p(oih |aj2h−1), p(oih |aj2h) are strictly positive (1 ≤
h ≤ r), and the equational part has exactly one solution. Here n is the cardi-
nality of A, and r ranges between 0 and n − 1.
The variables of the above systems of inequalities are x1, . . . , xn. Note that
for r = 0 the system consists only of n−1 equations of the form xj = 0, plus the
equation x1 + x2 + . . . + xn = 1. A system is called solvable if it has solutions.
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By definition, a system of the kind considered in the above definition has at
most one solution.
The condition on the uniqueness of solution requires to (attempt to) solve
more systems than they are actually solvable. Since the number of systems of
equations of the form given in Definition 4.1 increases very fast with n, it is rea-
sonable to raise the question of the effectiveness of our method. Fortunately, we
will see that the uniqueness of solution can be characterized by a simpler con-
dition (cf. Proposition 4.7), however still producing a huge number of systems.
We will investigate the complexity of our method in Section 4.1.
We are now ready to state our main result:
Theorem 4.2. Given a channel C, the Bayes risk Pe associated with C is con-
vexly generated by (U,Pe(U)), where U is the set of solutions to all solvable
systems in S(C).
Proof. We need to prove that, for every ~u ∈ D(n), there exist ~u1, ~u2, . . . , ~ut ∈ U ,
and convex coefficients λ1, λ2, . . . , λt such that
~u =
∑
i
λi~ui and Pe(~u) =
∑
i
λiPe(~ui)
Let us consider a particular ~u ∈ D(n). In the following, for each i, we will use ji
to denote the index j for which p(oi|aj)uj is maximum. Hence, we can rewrite
Pe(~u) as
Pe(~u) = 1 −
∑
i
p(oi|aji)uji (8)
We proceed by induction on n. All conditional probabilities p(oi|aj) that
appear in the proof are assumed to be strictly positive: we do not need to
consider the ones which are zero, because we are interested in maximizing the
terms of the form p(oi|aj)xj .
Base case (n = 2) In this case U is the set of solutions of all the systems of
the form
{p(oi|a1)x1 = p(oi|a2)x2 , x1 + x2 = 1}
or
{xj = 0 , x1 + x2 = 1}
and ~u ∈ D(2). Let c be the minimum x ≥ 0 such that
p(oi|a1)(u1 − x) = p(oi|a2)(u2 + x) for some i
or let c be u1 if such x does not exist. Analogously, let d be the minimum x ≥ 0
such that
p(oi|a2)(u2 − x) = p(oi|a1)(u1 + x) for some i
or let d be u2 if such x does not exist.
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Note that p(oi|a2)(u2 +c) ≥ 0, hence u1−c ≥ 0 and consequently u2 +c ≤ 1.
Analogously, u2 − d ≥ 0 and u1 + d ≤ 1. Let us define ~v, ~w (the corner points
of interest) as
~v = (u1 − c, u2 + c) ~w = (u1 + d, u2 − d)
Consider the convex coefficients
λ =
d
c + d
µ =
c
c + d
A simple calculation shows that
~u = λ~v + µ~w
It remains to prove that
Pe(~u) = λPe(~v) + µPe(~w) (9)
To this end, it is sufficient to show that Pe is defined in ~v and ~w by the same
formula as (8), i.e. that Pe(~v), Pe(~w) and Pe(~u) are obtained as values, in
~v, ~w and ~u, respectively, of the same linear function. This amounts to show
that the coefficients are the same, i.e. that for each i and k the inequality
p(oi|aji)vji ≥ p(oi|ak)vk holds, and similarly for ~w.
Let i and k be given. If ji = 1, and consequently k = 2, we have that
p(oi|a1)u1 ≥ p(oi|a2)u2 holds. Hence for some x ≥ 0 the equality p(oi|a1)(u1 −
x) = p(oi|a2)(u2 + x) holds. Therefore:
p(oi|a1)v1 = p(oi|a1)(u1 − c) by definition of ~v
≥ p(oi|a1)(u1 − x) since c ≤ x
= p(oi|a2)(u2 + x) by definition of x
≥ p(oi|a2)(u2 + c) since c ≤ x
= p(oi|a1)v2 by definition of ~v
If, on the other hand, ji = 2, and consequently k = 1, we have:
p(oi|a2)v2 = p(oi|a2)(u2 + c) by definition of ~v
≥ p(oi|a2)u2 since c ≥ 0
≥ p(oi|a1)u1 since ji = 2
≥ p(oi|a1)(u1 − c) since c ≥ 0
= p(oi|a1)v1 by definition of ~v
The proof that for each i and k the inequality p(oi|aji)wji ≥ p(oi|ak)wk holds
is analogous.
Hence we have proved that
Pe(~v) = 1 −
∑
i
p(oi|aji)vji and Pe(~w) = 1 −
∑
i
p(oi|aji)wji
and a simple calculation shows that (9) holds.
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Inductive case Let ~u ∈ D(n). Let c be the minimum x ≥ 0 such that for
some i and k
p(oi|aji)(uji − x) = p(oi|an)(un + x) ji = n − 1
or
p(oi|aji)(uji − x) = p(oi|ak)uk ji = n − 1 and k 6= n
or
p(oi|aji)uji = p(oi|an)(un + x) ji 6= n − 1
or let c be un−1 if such x does not exist. Analogously, let d be the minimum
x ≥ 0 such that for some i and k
p(oi|aji)(uji − x) = p(oi|an−1)(un−1 + x) ji = n
or
p(oi|aji)(uji − x) = p(oi|ak)uk ji = n and k 6= n − 1
or
p(oi|aji)uji = p(oi|an−1)(un−1 + x) ji 6= n
or let d be un if such x does not exist. Similarly to the base case, define ~v, ~w as
~v = (u1, u2, . . . , un−2, un−1 − c, un + c)
and
~w = (u1, u2, . . . , un−2, un−1 + d, un − d)
and consider the same convex coefficients
λ =
d
c + d
µ =
c
c + d
Again, we have ~u = λ~v + µ~w.
By case analysis, and following the analogous proof given for n = 2, we
can prove that for each i and k the inequalities p(oi|aji)vji ≥ p(oi|ak)vk and
p(oi|aji)wji ≥ p(oi|ak)wk hold, hence, following the same lines as in the base
case, we derive
Pe(~u) = λPe(~v) + µPe(~w)
We now prove that ~v and ~w can be obtained as convex combinations of
corner points of Pe in the hyperplanes (instances of D
(n−1)) defined by the
equations that give, respectively, the c and d above. More precisely, if c = un−1
the equation is xn−1 = 0. Otherwise, the equation is of the form
p(oi|ak)xk = p(oi|aℓ)xℓ
and analogously for d. We develop the proof for ~w; the case of ~v is analogous.
If d = un, then the hyperplane is defined by the equation xn = 0, and it
consists of the set of vectors of the form (x1, x2, . . . , xn−1). The Bayes risk is
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defined in this hyperplane exactly in the same way as Pe (since the contribution
of xn is null) and therefore the corner points are the same. By inductive hy-
pothesis, those corner points are given by the solutions to the set of inequalities
of the form given in Definition 4.1. To obtain the corner points in D(n) it is
sufficient to add the equation xn = 0.
Assume now that d is given by one of the other equations. Let us consider
the first one, the cases of the other two are analogous. Let us consider, therefore,
the hyperplane H (instance of D(n−1)) defined by the equation
p(oi|an)xn = p(oi|an−1)xn−1 (10)
It is convenient to perform a transformation of coordinates. Namely, represent
the elements of H as vectors ~y with
yj =
{
xj 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 2
xn−1 + xn j = n − 1
(11)
Consider the channel
C′ = 〈A′,O, p′(·|·)〉
with A′ = {a1, a2, . . . , an−1}, and
p′(ok|aj) =
{
p(ok|aj) 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 2
max{p1(k), p2(k)} j = n − 1
where
p1(k) = p(ok|an−1)
p(oi|an)
p(oi|an−1) + p(oi|an)
(p(oi|an) and p(oi|an−1) are from (10)), and
p2(k) = p(ok|an)
p(oi|an−1)
p(oi|an−1) + p(oi|an)
The Bayes risk in H is defined by
Pe(~y) =
∑
k
max
1≤j≤n−1
p′(ok|aj)yj
and a simple calculation shows that Pe(~y) = Pe(~x) whenever ~x satisfies (10) and
~y and ~x are related by (11). Hence the corner points of Pe(~x) over H can be
obtained from those of Pe(~y).
The systems in S(C) are obtained from those in S(C′) in the following way.
For each system in S(C′), replace the equation y1+y2+. . .+yn−1 = 1 by x1+x2+
. . .+xn−1 +xn = 1, and replace, in each equation, every occurrence of yj by xj ,
for j from 1 to n− 2. Furthermore, if yn−1 occurs in an equation E of the form
yn−1 = 0, then replace E by the equations xn−1 = 0 and xn = 0. Otherwise, it
must be the case that for some k1, k2, p
′(ok1 |an−1)yn−1 and p
′(ok2 |an−1)yn−1
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occur in two of the other equations. In that case, replace p′(ok1 |an−1)yn−1 by
p(ok1 |an−1)xn−1 if p1(k1) ≥ p2(k1), and by p(ok1 |an)xn otherwise. Analogously
for p′(ok2 |an−1)yn−1. Finally, add the equation p(oi|an)xn = p(oi|an−1)xn−1. It
is easy to see that the uniqueness of solution is preserved by this transformation.
The conversions to apply on the inequality part are trivial.
Note that S(C) is finite, hence the U in Theorem 4.2 is finite as well.
4.1 An alternative characterization of the corner points
In this section we give an alternative characterization of the corner points of the
Bayes risk. The reason is that the new characterization considers only systems
of equations that are guaranteed to have a unique solution (for the equational
part). As a consequence, we need to solve much less systems than those of
Definition 4.1. We characterize these systems in terms of graphs.
Definition 4.3. A labeled undirected multigraph is a tuple G = (V,L,E) where
V is a set of vertices, L is a set of labels and E ⊆ {({v, u}, l) | v, u ∈ V, l ∈ L}
is a set of labeled edges (note that multiple edges are allowed between the same
vertices). A graph is connected iff there is a path between any two vertices. A
tree is a connected graph without cycles. We say that a tree T = (VT , LT , ET )
is a tree of G iff VT ⊆ V,LT ⊆ L,ET ⊆ E.
Definition 4.4. Let C = (A,O, p(·|·)) be a channel. We define its associated
graph G(C) = (V,L,E) as V = A, L = O and ({a, a′}, o) ∈ E iff p(o|a), p(o|a′)
are both positive.
Definition 4.5. Let C = (A,O, p(·|·)) be a channel, let n = |A| and let T =
(VT , LT , ET ) be a tree of G(C). The system of inequalities generated by T is
defined as
p(oi|aj)xj = p(oi|ak)xk
p(oi|aj)xj ≥ p(oi|al)xl ∀ 1 ≤ l ≤ n
for all edges ({aj , ak}, oi) ∈ ET , plus the equalities
xj = 0 ∀aj /∈ VT
x1 + . . . + xn = 1
Let T(C) be the set of systems generated by all trees of G(C).
An advantage of this characterization is that it allows an alternative, simpler
proof of Theorem 4.2. The two proofs differ substantially. Indeed, the new one
is non-inductive and uses the proof technique of Proposition 3.8.
Theorem 4.6. Given a channel C, the Bayes risk Pe associated to C is convexly
generated by (U,Pe(U)), where U is the set of solutions to all solvable systems
in T(C).
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Proof. Let J = {1, . . . , |A|}, I = {1, . . . , |O|}. We define
m(~x, i) = max
k∈J
p(oi|ak)xk Maximum for column i
Ψ(~x) = {i ∈ I | m(~x, i) > 0} Columns with non-zero maximum
Φ(~x, i) = {j ∈ J | p(oi|aj)xj = m(~x, i)} Rows giving the maximum for col. i
The probability of error can be written as
Pe(~x) = 1 −
∑
i∈I
p(oi|aj(~x,i))xj(~x,i) where j(~x, i) = min Φ(~x, i) (12)
We now fix a point ~x /∈ U and we are going to show that there exist ~y, ~z ∈ D(n)
different than ~x such that (~x, Pe(~x)) = t(~y, Pe(~y)) + t̄(~z, Pe(~z)). Let M(~x) be
the indexes of the non-zero elements of ~x, that is M(~x) = {j ∈ J | xj > 0}
(we will simply write M if ~x is clear from the context. The idea is that we will
“slightly” modify some elements in M without affecting any of the sets Φ(~x, i).
We first define a relation ∼ on the set M as
j ∼ k iff ∃i ∈ Ψ(~x) : j, k ∈ Φ(~x, i)
and take ≈ as the reflexive and transitive closure of ∼ (≈ is an equivalence
relation). Now assume that ≈ has only one equivalence class, equal to M . Then
we can create a tree T as follows: we start from a single vertex aj , j ∈ M .
At each step, we find a vertex aj in the current tree such that j ∼ k for some
k ∈ M where ak is not yet in the tree (such a vertex always exist since M is
an equivalence class of ≈). Then we add a vertex ak and an edge ({aj , ak}, oi)
where i is the one from the definition of ∼. Note that since i ∈ Ψ(~x) we have that
p(oi|aj), p(oi|ak) are positive so this edge also belongs to G(C). Repeating this
procedure creates a tree of G(C) such that ~x is a solution to its corresponding
system of inequalities, which is a contradiction since ~x /∈ U .
So we conclude that ≈ has at least two equivalence classes, say C,D. The
idea is that we will add/subtract an ǫ from all elements of the class simultane-
ously, while preserving the relative ratio of the elements. We choose an ǫ > 0
small enough such that 0 < xj − ǫ and xj + ǫ < 1 for all j ∈ M and such
that subtracting it from any element does not affect the relative order of the
quantities p(oi|aj)xj , that is
p(oi|aj)xj > p(oi|ak)xk ⇒ p(oi|aj)(xj − ǫ) > p(oi|ak)(xk + ǫ) (13)
for all i ∈ I, j, k ∈ M .2 Then we create two points ~y, ~z ∈ D(n) as follows:
yj =





xj − xjǫ1 if j ∈ C
xj + xjǫ2 if j ∈ D
xj otherwise
zj =





xj + xjǫ1 if j ∈ C
xj − xjǫ2 if j ∈ D
xj otherwise
2Let δi,j,k = p(oi|aj)xj − p(oi|ak)xk. It is sufficient to take
ǫ < min({
δi,j,k
p(oi|aj) + p(oi|aj)
| δi,j,k > 0} ∪ {xj | j ∈ M})
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where ǫ1 = ǫ/
∑
j∈C xj and ǫ2 = ǫ/
∑
j∈D xj (note that xjǫ1, xjǫ2 ≤ ǫ) . It is
easy to see that ~x = 12~y +
1
2~z, it remains to show that Pe(~x) =
1
2Pe(~y)+
1
2Pe(~z).
We notice that M(~x) = M(~y) = M(~z) and Ψ(~x) = Ψ(~y) = Ψ(~z) since
xj > 0 iff yj > 0, zj > 0. We now compare Φ(~x, i) and Φ(~y, i). If i /∈ Ψ(~x) then
p(oi|ak) = 0, ∀k ∈ M so Φ(~x, i) = Φ(~y, i) = J . Assuming i ∈ Ψ(~x), we first
show that p(oi|aj)xj > p(oi|ak)xk implies p(oi|aj)yj > p(oi|ak)yk. This follows
from (13) since
p(oi|aj)yj ≥ p(oi|aj)(xj − ǫ) > p(oi|ak)(xk + ǫ) ≥ p(oi|ak)yk
This means that k /∈ Φ(~x, i) ⇒ k /∈ Φ(~y, i), in other words
Φ(~x, i) ⊇ Φ(~y, i) (14)
Now we show that k ∈ Φ(~x, i) ⇒ k ∈ Φ(~y, i). Assume k ∈ Φ(~x, i) and let
j ∈ Φ(~y, i) (note that Φ(~y, i) 6= ∅). By (14) we have j ∈ Φ(~x, i) which means
that p(oi|ak)xk = p(oi|aj)xj . Moreover, since i ∈ Ψ(~x) we have that j, k belong
to the same equivalence class of ≈. If j, k ∈ C then
p(oi|ak)yk = p(oi|ak)(xk − xkǫ1)
= p(oi|aj)(xj − xjǫ1) p(oi|ak)xk = p(oi|aj)xj
= p(oi|aj)yj
which means that k ∈ Φ(~y, i). Similarly for j, k ∈ D. If j, k /∈ C ∪ D then
xk = yk, xj = yj and the same result is immediate. So we have Φ(~x, i) =
Φ(~y, i), ∀i ∈ I. And symmetrically we can show that Φ(~x, i) = Φ(~z, i). This
implies that j(~x, i) = j(~y, i) = j(~z, i) (see (12)) so we finally have
1
2
Pe(~y) +
1
2
Pe(~z) =
1
2
(
1 −
∑
i∈I
p(oi|aj(~y,i))yj(~y,i) + 1 −
∑
i∈I
p(oi|aj(~z,i))zj(~z,i)
)
= 1 −
∑
i∈I
p(oi|aj(~x,i))(
1
2
yj(~x,i) +
1
2
zj(~x,i))
= Pe(~x)
Applying Proposition 3.8 completes the proof.
We now show that both characterizations give the same systems of equations,
that is S(C) = T(C).
Proposition 4.7. Consider a system of inequalities of the form given in Def-
inition 4.1. Then, the equational part has a unique solution if and only if the
system is generated by a tree of G(C).
Proof. if) Assume that the system is generated by a tree of G(C). Consider the
variable corresponding to the root, say x1. Express its children x2, . . . ,
xk in terms of x1. That is to say that, if the equation is ax1 = bx2, then
we express x2 as a/bx1. At the next step, we express the children of x2
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in terms of x2 an hence in terms of x1, . . . etc. Finally, we replace all x
′
is
by their expressions in terms of x1 in the equation
∑
i xi = 1. This has
exactly one solution.
only if) Assume by contradiction that the system is not generated by a tree.
Then we we can divide the variables in at least two equivalence classes with
respect to the equivalence relation ≈ defined in the proof of Theorem 4.6,
and we can define the same ~y defined a few paragraphs later. This ~y is a
different solution of the same system (also for the inequalities).
The advantage of Definition 4.5 is that it constructs directly solvable systems,
in contrast to Definition 4.1 which would oblige us to solve all systems of the
given form and keep only the solvable ones. We finally give the complexity of
computing the corner points of Pe using the tree characterization, which involves
counting the number of trees of G(C).
Proposition 4.8. Let C = (A,O, p(·|·)) be a channel and let n = |A|,m = |O|.
Computing the set of corner points of Pe for C can be performed in O(n(nm)
n−1)
time.
Proof. To compute the set of corner points of Pe we need to solve all the systems
of inequalities in T(C). Each of those is produced by a tree of G(C). In the worst
case, the matrix of the channel is non-zero everywhere, in which case G(C) is
the complete multigraph Kmn of n vertices, each pair of which is connected by
exactly m edges. Let K1n be the complete graph of n vertices (without multiple
edges). Cayley’s formula ([?]) gives its number σ(K1n) of spanning trees:
σ(K1n) = n
n−2 (15)
We now want to compute the total number τ(K1n) of trees of K
1
n. To create a
tree of k vertices, we have
(
n
k
)
ways to select k out of the n vertices of K1n and
σ(K1k) ways to form a tree with them. Thus
τ(K1n) =
n
∑
k=1
(
n
k
)
σ(K1k)
=
n
∑
k=1
n!
k!(n − k)!
kk−2 (15)
=
n
∑
k=1
1
(n − k)!
(k + 1) · . . . · n · kk−2
≤
n
∑
k=1
1
(n − k)!
nn−k · nk−2 k + i ≤ n
= nn−2
n−1
∑
l=0
1
l!
set l = n − k
≤ e · nn−2 since
∑∞
l=0
1
l! = e
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thus τ(K1n) ∈ O(n
n−2). Each tree of Kmn can be produced by a tree of K
1
n by
exchanging the edge between two vertices with any of the m available edges in
Kmn . Since a tree of K
m
n has at most n − 1 edges, for each tree of K
1
n we can
produce at most mn−1 trees of Kmn . Thus
τ(Kmn ) ≤ m
n−1τ(K1n) ∈ O(m
n−1nn−2)
Finally, for each tree we have to solve the corresponding system of inequalities.
Due to the form of this system, computing the solution can be done in O(n) time
by expressing all variables xi in terms of the root of the tree, and then replace
them in the equation
∑
i xi = 1. On the other hand, for each solution we have
to verify as many as n(n− 1) inequalities, so in total the solution can be found
in O(n2) time. Thus, computing all corner points takes O(n2mn−1nn−2) =
O(n(nm)n−1) time.
Note that, to improve a bound using Proposition 3.5, we need to compute the
maximum ratio f(~u)/g(~u) of all corner points ~u. Thus, we need only to compute
these points, not to store them. Still, as shown in the above proposition, the
number of the systems we need to solve in the general case is huge. However,
as we will see in Section 6.1, in certain cases of symmetric channel matrices the
complexity can be severely reduced to even polynomial time.
4.2 Examples
Example 4.9 (Binary hypothesis testing). The case n = 2 is particularly sim-
ple: the systems generated by C are all those of the form
{p(oi|a1)x1 = p(oi|a2)x2 , x1 + x2 = 1}
plus the two systems
{x1 = 0 , x1 + x2 = 1}
{x2 = 0 , x1 + x2 = 1}
These systems are always solvable, hence we have m + 2 corner points, where
we recall that m is the cardinality of O.
Let us illustrate this case with a concrete example: let C be the channel
determined by the following matrix:
o1 o2 o3
a1 1/2 1/3 1/6
a2 1/6 1/2 1/3
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Figure 1: The graph of the Bayes risk for the channel in Example 4.9 and
various bounds for it. Curve 1 represents the probability of error if we ignore
the observables, i.e. the function f(~x) = 1 − maxj xj . Curve 2 represents
the Bayes risk Pe(~x). Curve 3 represents the Hellman-Raviv bound
1
2H(A|O).
Curve 4 represents the Santhi-Vardy bound 1−2−H(A|O). Finally, Curves 5 and
6 represent the improvements on 3 and 4, respectively, that we get by applying
the method induced by our Proposition 3.5.
The systems generated by C are:
{x1 = 0 , x1 + x2 = 1}
{ 12x1 =
1
6x2 , x1 + x2 = 1}
{ 13x1 =
1
2x2 , x1 + x2 = 1}
{ 16x1 =
1
3x2 , x1 + x2 = 1}
{x1 = 0 , x1 + x2 = 1}
The solutions of these systems are: (0, 1), (1/4, 3/4), (3/5, 2/5), (2/3, 1/3), and
(1, 0), respectively. The value of Pe on these points is 0, 1/4, 3/10 (maximum),
1/3, and 0 respectively, and Pe is piecewise linear between these points, i.e. it
can be generated by convex combination of these points and its value on them.
Its graph is illustrated in Figure 1, where x1 is represented by x and x2 by 1−x.
Example 4.10 (Ternary hypothesis testing). Let us consider now a channel C
with three inputs. Assume the channel has the following matrix:
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Figure 2: Ternary hypothesis testing. The lower curve represents the Bayes risk
for the channel in Example 4.10, while the upper curve represents the Santhi-
Vardy bound 1 − 2−H(A|O).
o1 o2 o3
a1 2/3 1/6 1/6
a2 1/8 3/4 1/8
a3 1/10 1/10 4/5
The following is an example of a solvable system generated by C:
2
3x1 =
1
8x2
1
8x2 =
4
5x3
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
2
3x1 ≥
1
10x3
1
8x2 ≥
1
6x1
Another example is
1
6x1 =
3
4x2
x3 = 0
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
The graph of Pe is depicted in Figure 2, where x3 is represented by 1−x1−x2.
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5 Maximum Bayes risk and relation with strong
anonymity
In this section we discuss the Bayes risk in the extreme cases of maximum and
minimum (i.e. 0) capacity, and, in the second case, we illustrate the relation
with the notion of probabilistic strong anonymity existing in literature.
5.1 Maximum capacity
If the channel has no noise, which means that for each observable o there exists
at most one a such that p(o|a) 6= 0, then the Bayes risk is 0 for every input
distribution. In fact
Pe(~x) = 1 −
∑
o maxj p(o|aj)xj
= 1 −
∑
j
∑
o p(o|aj)xj
= 1 −
∑
j xj = 0
5.2 Capacity 0
The case in which the capacity of the channel is 0 is by definition obtained when
I(A;O) = 0 for all possible input distributions of A. From information theory
we know that this is the case iff A and O are independent (cf. [10, p.27]). Hence
we have the following characterization:
Proposition 5.1 ([10]). The capacity of a channel (A,O, p(·|·)) is 0 iff all the
rows of the matrix are the same, i.e. p(o|a) = p(o) = p(o|a′) for all o ∈ O and
a, a′ ∈ A.
The condition p(o|a) = p(o|a′) for all o, a, a′ has been called strong proba-
bilistic anonymity in [1] and it is equivalent to the condition p(a|o) = p(a) for
all o, a. The latter was considered as a definition of anonymity in [5] and it is
called conditional anonymity in [14].
Capacity 0 is the optimal case also with respect to the incapability of the
adversary of inferring the hidden information. In fact, the Bayes risk achieves
its highest possible value, for a given n (cardinality of A), when the rows of
the matrix are all the same and the distribution is uniform. To prove this, let
~x ∈ D(n) and let xk be the maximum component of ~x. We have
Pe(~x) = 1 −
∑
o maxj p(o|aj)xj
≤ 1 −
∑
o p(o|ak)xk
= 1 − xk
∑
o p(o|ak)
= 1 − xk
Now, the minimum possible value for xk is 1/n, which happens in the case of
uniform input distribution. We have therefore
Pe(~x) ≤ 1 −
1
n
=
n − 1
n
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namely, n − 1/n is an upper bound of the probability of error. It remains to
show that it is a maximum and that it is obtained when the rows are all the
same (p(o|aj) = p(o|a) for all o and j, and some a) and the input distribution
is uniform. This is indeed the case, as proven by the following:
Pe(
1
n
, 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
) = 1 −
∑
o maxj p(o|aj)
1
n
= 1 −
∑
o p(o|a)
1
n
= 1 − 1
n
∑
o p(o|a)
= n−1
n
An example of protocol with capacity 0 is the dining cryptographers in a
connected graph [5], under the assumption that the payer is always one of the
cryptographers, and that the coins are fair.
6 Application: Crowds
In this section we show how to apply the results of the previous sections to
the analysis of a security protocol, in order to obtain improved bounds on the
attacker’s probability of error. This involves modeling the protocol, computing
its channel matrix either analytically or using model-checking tools, and using
it to compute the corner points of the probability of error. We illustrate our
ideas on Crowds, a well-known anonymity protocol from the literature.
In this protocol, introduced by Reiter and Rubin in [23], a user (called the
initiator) wants to send a message to a web server without revealing its identity.
To achieve that, he routes the message through a crowd of users participating in
the protocol. The routing is performed in the following way: in the beginning,
the initiator randomly selects a user (called a forwarder), possibly himself, and
forwards the request to him. A forwarder, upon receiving a message, performs a
probabilistic choice. With probability pf (a parameter of the protocol) he selects
a new user and forwards once again the message. With probability 1 − pf he
sends the message directly to the server.
It is easy to see that the initiator is strongly anonymous with respect to the
server, as all users have the same probability of being the forwarder who finally
delivers the message. However, the more interesting case is when the attacker
is one of the users of the protocol (called a corrupted user) which uses his
information to find out the identity of the initiator. A corrupted user has more
information than the server since he sees other users forwarding the message
through him. The initiator, being the first in the path, has greater probability of
forwarding the message to the attacker than any other user, so strong anonymity
cannot hold. However, under certain conditions on the number of corrupted
users, Crowds can be shown to satisfy a weaker notion of anonymity called
probable innocence.
In our analysis, we consider two network topologies. In the first, used in the
original presentation of Crowds, all users are assumed to be able to communicate
with any other user, in other words the network graph is a clique. In this case,
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the channel matrix is symmetric and easy to compute. Moreover, due to the
symmetry of the matrix, the corner points of the probability of error are fewer
in number and have a simple form.
However, having a clique network is not always feasible in practice, as it is
the case for example in distributed systems. As the task of computing the matrix
becomes much harder in a non-clique network, we employ model-checking tools
to perform it automatically. The set of corner points, being finite, can also be
computed automatically by solving the corresponding systems of inequalities.
6.1 Crowds in a clique network
We consider an instance of Crowds with m users, of which n are honest and
c = m − n are corrupted. To construct the matrix of the protocol, we start by
identifying the set of anonymous facts, which depends on what the system is
trying to hide. In protocols where one user performs an action of interest (like
initiating a message in our example) and we want to protect his identity, the set
A would be the set of the users of the protocol. Note that the corrupted users
should not be included in this set, since we cannot expect the attacker’s own
actions to be hidden from him. So in our case we have A = {u1, . . . un} where
ui means that user i is the initiator.
The set of observables should also be defined, based on the visible actions
of the protocol and on the various assumptions made about the attacker. In
Crowds we assume that the attacker does not have access to the entire network
(such an attacker would be too powerful for this protocol) but only to the
messages that pass through a corrupted user. Each time a user i forwards the
message to a corrupted user we say that he is detected which corresponds to an
observable action in the protocol. Along the lines of other studies of Crowds
(e.g. [28]) we suppose that an attacker will not forward a message himself, since
by doing so he would not gain more information. So at each execution of the
protocol there is at most one detected user and we have O = {d1, . . . , dn} where
dj means that user j was detected.
Now we need to compute the probabilities p(dj |ui) for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. We
first observe some symmetries of the protocol. First, the probability of observing
the initiator is the same, independently of who is the initiator. We denote this
probability by α. Moreover, the probability of detecting a user other than the
initiator is the same for all other users. We denote this probability by β. It can
be shown ([23]) that
α = c
1 − n−1
m
pf
m − npf
β = α −
c
m
Note that there is also the possibility of not observing any user, if the message
arrives to a server without passing through any corrupted user. To compute
the matrix, we condition on the event that some user was observed, which is
reasonable since otherwise anonymity is not an issue. Thus the conditional
28
d1 d2 . . . d20
u1 0.468 0.028 . . . 0.028
u2 0.028 0.468 . . . 0.028
...
...
...
. . .
...
u20 0.028 0.028 . . . 0.468
Figure 3: The channel matrix of Crowds for n = 20, c = 5, pf = 0.7. The events
ui, dj mean that user i is the initiator and user j was detected respectively.
probabilities of the matrix are:
p(dj |ui) =
{
α
s
if i = j
β
s
otherwise
where s = α + (n − 1)β. The matrix for n = 20, c = 5, pf = 0.7 is shown in
Figure 3.
An advantage of the symmetry is that the corner points of the probability
of error for such a matrix have a simple form.
Proposition 6.1. Let (A,O, p(·|·)) be a channel. Assume that all values of the
matrix p(·|·) are either α or β, with α, β > 0, and that there is at most one α
per column. Then all solutions to the systems of Definition 4.5 have at most
two distinct non-zero elements, equal to x and α
β
x for some x ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Since all values of the matrix are either α or β, the equations of all the
systems in Definition 4.5 are of the form xi = xj or α·xi = β ·xj .
3 Assume that a
solution of such a system has three distinct non-zero elements x1 > x2 > x3 > 0.
We consider the following two cases:
1. x2, x3 are related to each other by an equation. Since x2 > x3 this equation
can only be α · x2 = β · x3, where p(o|a2) = α for some observable o.
Since there is at most one α per column we have p(o|a1) = β and thus
p(o|a1)x1 = β x1 > β x3 = α x2 = p(o|a2)x2 which violates the inequalities
of Definition 4.5.
2. x2, x3 are not related to each other. Thus they must be related to x1 by
two equations (assuming α > β) β · x1 = α · x2 and β · x1 = α · x3. This
implies that x2 = x3 which is a contradiction.
Similarly for more than three non-zero elements.
The above proposition allows us to efficiently compute the scaling factor of
Proposition 3.5 to improve the Santhi-Vardy bound.
3Note that by construction of G(C) the coefficients of all equations are non-zero, so in our
case either α or β.
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Figure 4: The improvement (represented by the scaling factor) with respect to
the Santhi-Vardy bound for various instances of Crowds.
Proposition 6.2. Let (A,O, p(·|·)) be a channel with n = |A|. Assume that
all columns and all rows of the matrix p(·|·) have exactly one element equal to
α > 0 and all others equal to β > 0. Then the scaling factor of Proposition 3.5
can be computed in O(n2) time.
Proof. By Proposition 6.1, all corner points of Pe have two distinct non-zero
elements x and α
β
x. If we fix the number k1 of elements equal to x and the
number k2 of elements equal to
α
β
x then x can be uniquely computed in constant
time. Due to the symmetry of the matrix, Pe as well as the Santhi-Vardy bound
will have the same value for all corner points with the same k1, k2. So it is
sufficient to compute the ratio in only one of them. Then by varying k1, k2, we
can compute the best ratio without even computing all the corner points. Note
that there are O(n2) possible values of k1, k2 and since we need to compute
one point for each of them, the total computation can be performed in O(n2)
time.
We can now apply the algorithm described above to compute the scaling
factor co ≤ 1. Multiplying the Santhi-Vardy bound by co will give us an im-
proved bound for the probability of error. The results are shown in Figure 4.
We plot the obtained scaling factor while varying the number of honest users,
for c = 5 and for various values of the parameter pf . A lower scaling factor
means a bigger improvement with respect to the Santhi-Vardy bound. We re-
mind that we probability of error, in this case, gives the probability that the
attacker “guesses” the wrong sender. The higher it is, the more secure is the
protocol. It is worth noting that the scaling factor increases when the number of
30
Figure 5: An instance of Crowds with nine users in a grid network. User 5 is
the only corrupted one.
honest users increases or when the probability of forwarding increases. In other
words, the improvement is better when the probability of error is smaller (and
the system is less anonymous). When increasing the number of users (without
increasing the number c of corrupted ones), the protocol offers more anonymity
and the capacity increases. In this case the Santhi-Vardy bound becomes closer
to the corner points of Pe and there is little room for improvement.
6.2 Crowds in a grid network
We now consider a grid-shaped network as shown in Figure 5. In this network
there is a total of nine users, each of whom can only communicate with the four
that are adjacent to him. We assume that the network “wraps” at the edges,
so user 1 can communicate with both user 3 and user 7. Also, we assume that
the only corrupted user is user 5.
In this example we have relaxed the assumption of a clique network, show-
ing that a model-checking approach can be used to analyze more complicated
network topologies (but of course is limited to specific instances). Moreover,
the lack of homogeneity in this network creates a situation where the maximum
probability of error is given by a non-uniform input distribution. This empha-
sizes the importance of abstracting from the input distribution: assuming a
uniform one would be not justified in this example.
Similarly to the previous example, the set of anonymous events will be A =
{u1, u2, u3, u4, u6, u7, u8, u9} where ui means that user i is the initiator. For the
observable events we notice that only the users 2, 4, 6 and 8 can communicate
with the corrupted user. Thus we have O = {d2, d4, d6, d8} where dj means that
user j was detected.
To compute the channel’s matrix, we have modeled Crowds in the language
of the PRISM model-checker ([?]), which is essentially a formalism to describe
Markov Decision Processes. PRISM can compute the probability of reaching
a specific state starting from a given one. Thus, each conditional probability
p(dj |ui) is computed as the probability of reaching a state where the attacker
has detected user j, starting from the state where i is the initiator. Similarly to
the previous example, we compute all probabilities conditioned on the fact that
some observation was made, which corresponds to normalizing the rows of the
matrix.
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d2 d4 d6 d8
u1 0.33 0.33 0.17 0.17
u3 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.17
u7 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.33
u9 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.33
u2 0.68 0.07 0.07 0.17
u4 0.07 0.68 0.17 0.07
u6 0.07 0.17 0.68 0.07
u8 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.68
Figure 6: The channel matrix of the examined instance of Crowds. The symbols
ui, dj mean that user i is the initiator and user j was detected respectively.
In Figure 6 the channel matrix is displayed for the examined Crowds in-
stance, computed using probability of forwarding pf = 0.8. We have split the
users in two groups, the ones who cannot communicate directly with the cor-
rupted user, and the ones who can. When a user of the first group, say user
1, is the initiator, there is a higher probability of detecting the users that are
adjacent to him (users 2 and 4) than the other two (users 6 and 8) since the mes-
sage needs two steps to arrive to the latters. So p(d2|u1) = p(d4|u1) = 0.33 are
greater than p(d6|u1) = p(d8|u1) = 0.17. In the second group users have direct
communication to the attacker, so when user 2 is the initiator, the probability
p(d2|u2) of detecting him is high. From the remaining three observables d8 has
higher probability since user 8 can be reached from user 2 in one step, while
users 4 and 6 need two steps. Inside each group the rows are symmetric since
the users behave similarly. However between the groups the rows are different
which is caused by the different connectivity to the corrupted user 5.
We can now compute the probability of error for this instance of Crowds,
which is displayed in the lower curve of Figure 7. Since we have eight users, to
plot this function we have to map it to the three dimensions. We do this by
considering the users 1, 3, 7, 9 to have the same probability x1, the users 2, 8
to have the same probability x2 and the users 4, 6 to have the same probability
1−x1 −x2. Then we plot Pe as a function of x1, x2 in the ranges 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1/4,
0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1/2. Note that when x1 = x2 = 0 there are still two users (4, 6)
among whom the probability is distributed, so Pe is not 0. The upper curve of
Figure 7 shows the Santhi and Vardy’s bound on the probability of error. Since
all the rows of the matrix are different the bound is not tight, as illustrated.
We can obtain a better bound by applying Proposition 3.5. The set of cor-
ner points, characterized by Theorem 4.2, is finite and can be automatically
constructed by solving the corresponding systems of inequalities. After find-
ing the corner points, we compute the scaling factor co = maxu Pe(~u)/h(~u),
where h is the original bound, and take co · h as the improved bound. In
our example we found co = 0.925 which was given for the corner point ~u =
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Figure 7: The lower curve is the probability of error in the examined instance
of Crowds. The upper two are the Santhi and Vardy’s bound and its improved
version.
(0.17, 0.17, 0.17, 0.17, 0.08, 0.08, 0.08, 0.08).
7 Protocol re-execution
In this section we consider the case in which a protocol is executed multiple
times with the same input, either forced by the attacker himself or by some
external factor. For instance, in Crowds users send messages along randomly
selected routes. For various reasons this path might become unavailable, so
the user will need to create a new one, thus re-executing the protocol. If the
attacker is part of the path, he could also cause it to fail by not forwarding
messages, thus obliging the sender to recreate it (unless measures are taken to
prevent this, as it is done in Crowds).
From the point of view of hypothesis testing, the above scenario corresponds
to repeating the experiment multiple times while the same hypothesis holds
through the repetition. We assume that the the outcomes of the repeated ex-
periments are independent. This corresponds to assuming that the protocol is
memoryless, i.e. each time it is reactivated, it works according to the same prob-
ability distribution, independently from what happened in previous sessions.
The Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing requires the knowledge of the
matrix of the protocol and of the a priori distribution of the hypotheses. The
first assumption (knowledge of the matrix of the protocol) is usually granted
in our setting, because the way the protocol works is public. The second as-
sumption, on the contrary, is not obvious, since the attacker does not usually
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know the distribution of the information that is supposed to be concealed by
the protocol. However it was showed in [3] that, under certain conditions, the
a priori distribution becomes less and less relevant with the repetition of the
experiment, and it “washes out” at the limit. In this section, we recall briefly
the results in [3] and we extend them by proving a lower bound on the limit of
the Bayes risk.
Let (A,O, p(·|·)) be the channel of a protocol S. The experiment obtained by
re-executing the protocol n times with the same event a as input will be denoted
by Sn. The observables in Sn are sequences ~o = (o1, . . . , on) of observables of
S and, since we consider the repetitions to be independent, the conditional
probabilities for Sn will be given by4
p(~o|a) =
n
∏
i=1
p(oi|a) (16)
Let fn : O
n → A be the decision function adopted by the adversary to infer
the anonymous action from the sequence of observable. Also let Efn : A → 2
On
be the error region of fn and let ηfn : A → [0, 1] be the function that associates
to each a ∈ A the probability of inferring the wrong input event on the basis of
fn, namely ηfn(a) =
∑
~o∈Efn (a)
p(~o|a). Then the probability of error of fn will
be the expected value of ηfn(a):
Pfn =
∑
a∈A
p(a)ηfn(a)
The MAP rule and the notion of MAP decision function can be extended to
the case of protocol re-execution in the obvious way. Namely a MAP decision
function in the context of protocol repetition is a function fn such that for each
~o ∈ On and a, a′ ∈ A
fn(~o) = a ⇒ p(~o|a)p(a) ≥ p(~o|a
′)p(a′)
Also in the case of protocol repetition the MAP rule gives the best possible
result, namely if fn is a MAP decision function then Pfn ≤ Phn for any other
decision function hn.
The following definition establishes a condition on the matrix under which
the knowledge of the input distribution becomes irrelevant for hypothesis test-
ing.
Definition 7.1 ([3]). Given a protocol with channel (A,O, p(·|·)), we say that
the protocol is determinate iff all rows of the matrix p are pairwise different, i.e.
the probability distributions p(·|a), p(·|a′) are different for each pair a, a′ with
a 6= a′.
4With a slight abuse of notations we denote by p the probability matrix of both S and Sn.
It will be clear from the context to which we refer to.
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Next proposition shows that if a protocol is determinate, then it can be
approximated by a decision function which compares only the elements along
the column corresponding to the observed event, without considering the input
probabilities.
Proposition 7.2 ([3]). Given a determinate protocol (A,O, p(·|·)), for any
distribution on A, any MAP decision functions fn and any decision function
gn : O
n → A such that
gn(~o) = a ⇒ p(~o|a) ≥ p(~o|a
′) ∀~o ∈ On∀a, a′ ∈ A
we have that gn approximates fn. Namely, for any ǫ > 0, there exists n such
that the probability of the set {~o ∈ On | fn(~o) 6= gn(~o)} is smaller than ǫ.
The conditional probability p(o|a) (resp. p(~o|a)) is called likelihood of a given
o (resp. ~o). The criterion for the definition of gn used in Proposition 7.2 is to
choose the a which maximizes the likelihood of o (resp. ~o), and it is known in
literature as the Maximum Likelihood criterion (ML). This rule is quite popular
in statistic, its advantage over the Bayesian approach being that it does not
require any knowledge of the a priori probability on A.
When the protocol is determinate, the probability of error associated to the
ML rule converges to 0, as shown by the following proposition. The same holds,
of course, for the MAP rule, because of Proposition 7.2.
Proposition 7.3 ([3]). Given a determinate protocol (A,O, p(·|·)), for any
distribution pA on A and for any ǫ > 0, there exists n such that the property
gn(~o) = a ⇒ p(~o|a) ≥ p(~o|a
′) ∀a′ ∈ A
determines a unique decision function gn on a set of probability greater than
1 − ǫ, and the probability of error Pgn is smaller than ǫ.
One extreme case of determinate matrix is when the capacity is maximum.
In this case the probability of error of the MAP and ML rules is always 0,
independently from n. The proof is analogous to the one of Section 5.1.
Consider now the case in which determinacy does not hold, i.e. when there
are at least two identical rows in the matrix, say a1 and a2. In such case, for the
sequences ~o ∈ On such that p(~o|a1) (or equivalently p(~o|a2)) is maximum, the
value of a ML function gn is not uniquely determined, because we could choose
either a1 or a2. Hence we have more than one ML decision function.
More generally, if there are k identical rows corresponding to a1, a2, . . . , ak,
the ML criterion gives k different possibilities every time we get an observable
~o ∈ On for which p(~o|a1) is maximum. Intuitively this is a situation which may
induce an error which is difficult to get rid of, even by repeating the protocol
many times.
The situation is different if we know the a priori distribution and we use
a MAP function fn. In this case we have to maximize p(a)p(~o|a) and even in
case of identical rows, the a priori knowledge can help to make a sensible guess
about the most likely a.
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Both in the case of the ML and of the MAP functions, however, we can
show that the probability of error is bound from below by an expression that
depends on the probabilities of a1, a2, . . . , ak only. In fact, we can show that
this is the case for any decision function, whatever criterion they use to select
the hypothesis.
Proposition 7.4. If the matrix has identical rows corresponding to a1, a2, . . . , ak
then for any n and any decision function hn we have that
Phn ≥ (k − 1) min1≤i≤k{p(ai)}
Proof. Assume that p(aℓ) = min1≤i≤k{p(ai)}. We have:
Phn =
∑
a∈A
p(a)ηfn(a)
≥
∑
1≤i≤k
p(ai)ηfn(ai)
≥
∑
1≤i≤k
p(aℓ)ηfn(ai) (p(aℓ) = min1≤i≤k{p(ai)})
=
∑
1≤i≤k
p(aℓ)
∑
hn(~o) 6=ai
p(~o|ai)
=
∑
1≤i≤k
p(aℓ)
∑
hn(~o) 6=ai
p(~o|aℓ) (p(~o|ai) = p(~o|aℓ))
= p(aℓ)
∑
1≤i≤k
∑
hn(~o) 6=ai
p(~o|aℓ)
= p(aℓ)
∑
1≤i≤k
(1 −
∑
hn(~o)=ai
p(~o|aℓ) )
≥ (k − 1)p(aℓ) (
∑
1≤i≤k
∑
hn(~o)=ai
p(~o|aℓ) ≤ 1)
Note that the expression (k− 1)p(aℓ) does not depend on n. Assuming that
the ai’s have positive probability, from the above proposition we derive that the
probability of error is always greater than a constant strictly greater than 0.
Hence the probability of error does not converge to 0.
Corollary 7.5. If there exist a1, a2, . . . , ak with positive probability, k ≥ 2, and
whose corresponding rows in the matrix are identical, then for any n and any
decision function hn the probability of error is bound from below by a positive
constant.
Remark 7.6. In Proposition 7.4 we are allowed to consider any subset of iden-
tical rows. In general it is not necessarily the case that a larger subset gives a
better bound. In fact, as the subset increases, k increases too, but the minimal
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p(ai) may decrease. To find the best bound in general one has to consider all
the possible subsets of identical rows.
Capacity 0 is the extreme case of identical rows: it corresponds, in fact, to
the situation in which all the rows of the matrix are identical. This is, of course,
the optimal case with respect to information-hiding. All the rows are the same,
consequently the observations are of no use for the attacker to infer the input
event, i.e. to define the “right” gn(~o), since all p(~o|a) are maximum.
The probability of error of any decision function is bound from below by
(|A| − 1) mini p(ai). Note that by Remark 7.6 we may get better bounds by
considering subsets of the rows instead than all of them.
8 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have investigated the hypothesis testing problem from the
point of view of an adversary playing against an information-hiding protocol,
seen as a channel in the information-theoretic sense. We have considered the
Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing, and specifically the Maximum Apos-
teriori Probability (MAP) rule. We have shown that the function Pe expressing
the probability of error for the MAP rule is piecewise linear, and we have given
a constructive characterization of a special set of points which allows computing
the maximum Pe over all probability distributions on the channel’s inputs. This
set of points is determined uniquely by the matrix associated to the channel.
As a byproduct of this study, we have also improved both the Hellman-Raviv
and the Santhi-Vardy bounds.
A common objection to the Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing is that
it requires the knowledge of the input distribution (a priori probability). This
is a valid criticism in our setting as well, since in general the adversary does not
have a priori knowledge of the hidden information. Under certain conditions
depending on the protocol’s matrix, however, the adversary may be able to
infer the input distribution with arbitrary precision by repeatedly observing
the outcome of consecutive sessions. Our plans for future work include the
investigation of the conditions under which such inference is possible, and the
study of the corresponding probability of error as a function of the matrix.
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